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Cert to: Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin (~for the court; 
Abrahamson, diss.; Bablitch, 
diss.) 
State/Criminal Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr challenges decision that probation offi-
cers may ~h his ~e without a warrant if they have 
"reasonable grounds to believe" that he is violating a condition 
of his probation. 
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2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Petr was convicted in 
state court of the misdemeanors of resisting arrest, disorderly 
...-------..___ 
conduct, and obstructing an officer. Petr was placed on proba-
tion for those offenses. During petr's third year of probation, 
a probation supervisor, Michael Lew, received a call from a po-
lice detective that petr "may have had guns in his apartment." 
Although Lew believed the source of information was a captain at 
the Detective Bureau, that captain later testified that he did 
not believe he had called Le~ but the call may have been placed 
by one of his detectives. r..Jew ~ted two or three hours for 
petr's probation officer. Then he and another probation officer 
-- ·-· ___, 
went to search petr 's apartment, accompanied by three police 
officers. Lew explained that the police officers were brought 
along in order to protect the two probation officers. 
Upon arriving at petr's apartment, Lew informed petr who 
they were and informed petr that they were going to search his 
residence. One of the police officers apparently pointed toward 
a table with a broken drawer that exposed the contents of the 
drawer. Lew found a gun in the drawer, handed the gun over to 
the police, and directed the officers to arrest petr for a proba-
tion violation. The other probation officer found and seized 
marijuana lying on a table. 
Petr was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon 
and possession of a controlled substance. The trial court denied 
petr's motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search. 
The court held that a probation officer did not need a search 
warrant to engage in a search of a probationer's residence, but 
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rather must act reasonably in making such a search. The court 
concluded that the search in this case was reasonable based on 
the evidence. The trial court further found, as a rna t ter of 
fact, that the search was not a ,police search and that the police 
officers were present solely to protect the probation officers. 
Petr was convicted and sentenced to a term of two years. 
~he Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed. It concluded that 
a probation officer may conduct a a warrantless search of a pro-
bationer1s · residence even if the search does not meet one of the 
usual exceptions to the warrant requirement, as long as the 
search is reasonable. The court concluded that the tip from the 
police constituted reasonable grounds to believe that petr 1 s 
residence contained contraband. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed. The court noted that 
neither it, nor the u.s. Supreme Court, had ever recognized that 
an exception to the warrant requirement could be based on a per-
son 1 s probationary status. Nevertheless, the court concluded 
that such an exception was warranted. ~he court noted that there 
was ample authority among federal courts of appeals and state 
courts for the viewpoint that probation or parole officers may 
conduct warrantless searches of a probationer 1 s or parolee 1 s 
residence, although it noted that there was also some authority 
for the viewpoint that a war rant was necessary. Pet. App. A5 
(citing cases). The court stated that it had already recognized 
that the nature of probation places limits on the liberty and 
privacy interests of probationers. See State v. Tarrell, 74 
Wis.2d 647, 653-654, 247 N.W.2d 696 (1976) ("Conditions of proba-
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tion must at times limit the constitutional freedoms of the pro-
bationer. Necessary infringements on these freedoms are permis-
sible as long as they are not overly broad and are reasonably 
related to the person's rehabilitation.") A probation officer 
has the dual role of assisting in rehabilitating the probationer 
and protecting the public, and this creates a special relation-
ship between the officer and the probationer. Because of this 
special relationship, "'the law relating to probation searches 
cannot be strictly governed by automatic reference to ordinary 
search and seizure law.'" Pet. App. A6 (citation omitted). 
Rather, a court must balance the probationer's right to privacy 
against the probation system's interest in ensuring that the 
probationer is complying with probation conditions. Based "on 
the nature of probation," the court concluded that "a probation 
agent who reasonably believes that a probationer is violating the 
terms of probation may conduct a warrantless search of a proba-
tioner's residence." Pet. App. A7. 
The court then turned to the standard that should govern 
the agent's belief. It concluded that the standard must be less 
than "probable cause," and is met when the officer has "reason-
able grounds" to believe the probationer is violating a condition 
of probation. That is the standard established by a Wisconsin 
Dept. of Health and Human Services rule, which allows probation 
agents to search a probationer's residence "if there are reason-
able grounds to believe that the quarters • contain contra-
band." The court concluded that this formulation met the consti-
tutional standard of reasonableness. 
'~....__....- ' 
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Last, the court concluded that Lew had "reasonable grounds" 
to search petr's home on the basis of the police tip. In addi-
tion, it noted that the record supported the trial court's find-
ing that this was not a police search, and that the police as-
sistance was solely for protection of the probation officers. 
Justice Abrahamson dissented. She agreed that probationers 
have a different expectation of privacy than other citizens and 
that probation officers must have some latitude if they are to 
exercise their supervisory responsibilities. Nevertheless, she 
disagreed that the warrant requirement could be so easily cast 
aside. A probation officer should be allowed to search a proba-
tioner's home if the officer has "reasonable cause" to believe 
the probationer is violating a condition of probation and be-
lieves that evidence of the violation will be found in the home 
to be searched. 'Evidentiary support for the reasonable cause 
standard need not meet the standards of Illinois v. Gates, but · 
rather should be flexible. The issuance of a warrant on this 
kind of showing would not be an undue burden on the officer and 
would provide the required protection for the probationer. In 
addition, this warrant requirement would not impede the dual 
goals of probation, that ofprotecting the public and rehabilitat-
ing the probationer. Justice Abrahamson added that, even if she 
agreed with the majority that no warrant was needed, she would 
dissent on the grounds that the facts of this case did not even 
meet the "reasonable grounds" standard set out by the majority. 
Justice Bablitch dissented on the latter ground raised by 
Justice Abrahamson. He noted that the only basis for the war-
- 6 -
rantless search in this case was the supervisor's testimony that 
some detective told him that petr "may have had guns in his 
apartment." There was no evidence as to which detective phoned 
in this information, the source of the detective's information, 
or any other fact that indicated the probation supervisor had 
reason to believe petr had anything to do with guns. Based on 
these facts, even the majority's minimal test of "reasonable 
grounds" was not met. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr first argues that there is signifi-
cant split in the federal courts of appeals and the highest state 
courts as to whether a warrant must be obtained before searching 
a probationer's residence. Numerous courts have ruled that a 
probation officer must get a warrant before searching a proba-
tioner's home, while other courts have decided the issue to the 
contrary. Pet. 9-10, citing cases (also, see Discussion below). 
This Court should grant cert to resolve the conflict. 
Petr next contends that the decision by the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court is in conflict with controlling principles of law 
announced by this Court. In Payton v. New York, 445 u.s. 573, 
589-590 (1980), the Court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment 
"has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house" and that 
"absent exigent circumstances that threshold may not reasonably 
be crossed without a warrant." The Wise. S.Ct., "out of whole 
cloth and with no supporting authority from this Court," has 
improperly created a "probationer" exception to the normal re-
quirement that a warrant must be obtained before a person's resi-
-:t 
dence is/searched. In addition, even if a warrant were not re-
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qui red, the state court erred in concluding that a standard of 
"reasonable grounds to believe," rather than the stricter stand-
ard of probable cause, is sufficient to justify a search by a 
probation agent. 
Finally, petr contends that the facts presented in this 
case did not even meet the minimal standard of "reasonable 
grounds to believe" established by the Wise. s.ct. 
4. DISCUSSION: Petr is correct that there is a split in 
the federal and state courts on this issue. Although some cases 
deal with parolees and others with probationers, a number of 
courts have stated that the two groups should be considered as 
presenting similar questions for purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 678 F.2d 32, 33 n.l 
(CAS 1982): State v. Earnest, 293 N.W.2d 365, 368 n. 2 (Minn. 
1980). I think this is probably correct, particularly for pur-
poses of evaluating the significance of the lower court split.l 
One of the first cases to deal with this issue at length was 
Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (cA( 975) (en bane), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975). In that case, the court rejected a 
previously long-standing view that parolees have almost no Fourth 
Amendment rights (citing Morissev v. Brewster, 408 u.s. 471 
(1972) as evincing greater protection for parolees), but conclud-
1Nevertheless, for those who may feel that this distinction 
does present a real difference for purposes of the lower court 
split, I note after each case the area it deals with. (Both petr 
and the Wise. s.ct. omitted this information in their case 
citations, as they concluded it was unnecessary.) 
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ed that the "special relationship" between the parole officer and 
the parolee meant that parole officers should be allowed to 
search without a warrant, as long as the search was reasonable. 
A number of highest state courts adopted the Latta reasoning and 
result, with some articulating various standards as to what would 
constitute a "reasonable" basis for a search. See People v. 
Anderson, 189 Colo. 34, 536 P.2d 302, 305 (1975) (parole): People 
v. Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d 175, 371 N.E.2d 794, 796 (1977) (parole): 
State v. Earnest, 293 N.W.2d at 368-369 (Minn. 1980) (probation): 
State v. Pinson, 657 P.2d 1095, 1099-1101 (Idaho 1983) (proba-
tion): State v. Velasque, 672 P.2d 1088, 1094 (Utah 1983) (pa-
role): State v. Fields, 686 P.2d 1379, 1389-1390 (Hawaii 1984) 
(probation: must have "specific and articulable" grounds). One 
other federal circuit court of appeals has followed Latta. See 
United States v. Scott, 678 F.2d at 34-35 (CAS 1982) (parole; 
need a "reasonable suspicion"). Some of these courts have empha-
sized that police officers do not have the same right to search 
without a warrant, but that police may accompany parole or proba-
tion officers if necessary for assistance. See, e.g., Anderson, 
536 P.2d at 305: Pinson, 657 P.2d at 1101. 
Other courts have held that a warrant is required in order 
to search the home of a probationer or parolee. An early case, 
State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Iowa 1970), cert. denied, 
398 u.s. 938 (1970), stated flatly that parolees have the same 
Fourth Amendment rights as other citizens. Later cases, decided 
after Latta, have usually referred to that CA9 decision and have 
explicitly rejected the Latta approach. See United States v. 
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Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 789 (CA4 1978) (parole; accepts Justice 
Hufstedler's dissent in Latta); United States v. Rea, 678 F.2d 
382, 387-388 (CA2 1982) (probation; requiring an officer to get a 
warrant does not significantly interfere with the dual rehabili-
tative and law enforcement functions of probation). See also 
State v. Fogarty, 610 P.2d 140, 152 (1980) (probation officer 
must get a warrant to protect the privacy of third parties who 
may be living with the probationer). Other cases, also cited by 
petr as upholding the warrant requirement, ar~ a bit more equ i vo-
cal. See 'ramez v. State, 534 s.~'l.2d 686, 691-692 (Tex. 1976) 
(condition in probation that allowed for searches without any 
probable cause and without any basis for suspicion is too broad); 
State v. Culberson, 563 P.2d 1224, 1227-1229 (Or. 1\pp. 1977) 
(search must be based on either probable cause or a condition of 
probation in which probationer has consented to certain search-
es). See also United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 833 (CA3 
1983) (en bane) (holds . that exclusionary rule does not apply to 
probation revocation hearing; in dicta, states that special fea-
tures of probation system do not also mean that a probationer is 
not protected by the warrant requirement, citing Rea.) In gener-
al, courts that have upheld the warrant requirement have acknowl-
edged the special features and needs of probation or parole sys-
tems, but have concluded that the warrant requirement does not 
interfere with those needs so significantly that a court is jus-
tified in removing the warrant protection for parolees or proba-
tioners. 
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On the merits ot this issue, I am sure reasonable people 
may disagree. The Court has recognized only a few exceptions to 
the warrant requirement,~d it -is arguable whether - the- riaeure of 
- ------. 
probationary or parole status should constitute an additional 
exception. Regardless of the merits, however, the case meets 
some of the usual criteria for The issue is a~neric 
one of law, not connected to any factbound analysis, and it will 
~
probably arise with some frequency given the extensive systems of 
parole and probation in this country. In addition, the lower 
courts are split on the issue. Although the Wise. s.ct. conclud-
ed that the weight of authority conformed with its conclusion 
that no warrant is required (thus perhaps allowing this Court to 
deny cert so as to let all other courts arrive at this same con-
clusio, on their own), I am not confident that the split will be 
resolved that easily. The two federal circuits that have spoken 
most recently on the issue, CAS in Scott and CA2 in Rea (both in 
1982), have arrived at opposite conclusions. The other circuits, 
other than CA9 (and CA3 in dicta), have not yet ruled on the 
question. Thus, this may be an issue on which the Court's guid-
ance will be needed. 
I do not think that this particular case presents any sig-
nificant problems, in terms ot being a vehicle for review of the 
issue. As one can see from a review of the lower court opinions, 
most have dealt with parolees rather than probationers. Although 
I do not think the constitutional analysis should differ signifi-
cantly for the two groups, the Court may wish to wait for a pa-
rolee case. There is also a related question that arises in some 
of these cases and is not presented here. That regards whether a 
probation or parole agreement may contain a condition in which 
the individual consents to certain warrantless searches, under a 
specified standard of reasonableness. (Such a condition may be 
valid even if warrants would otherwise be required.) Thus, the 
Court may have to decide the threshold issue of a probationer's 
Fourth Amendment rights in a case such as this one, and address 
the validity of conditions in a second case. Alternatively, the 
Court could wait for a case that presented the use of a condition 
in a probation or parole agreement. 
Because this case is a possible candidate for a grant, 1 
recommend calling for a response. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend CFR. 
There is no response. 
October l, 1986 Feldblum Opn in petn 
J?~ ~ --..·..., ~~ .. ~ 
J ust1ce tlrennan 
Justice Marshall 
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JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
This case presents the question whether the home of a 
probationer may be searched without complying with the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court held that such a search is permissible if the 
probation officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a t;~ 
condition of probation ~d. --Wis. 2d --, ~ .~ 
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· significance. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
Mr. Justice Powell March 27, 1986 
From: Andy 
Re: No. 86-5324, Griffin v. State of Wisconsin 
Oral Argument: Monday April 20, 1987 (3d case) 
Cert to the Wisconsin S. Ct. (Day, with 2 dissents) 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
The issue is whether a probation officer's warrantless 
search of a probationer's home violates the 4th Amendment 
when the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that a 
probation violation has occurred. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In 1980 petitioner Joseph Griffin was convicted in 
state court of disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and 
obstructing an officer. He was placed on probation for an 
unspecified number of years. The Wisconsin probation stat-
ute places numerous restrictions on a probationer's rights; 
it provides, for example, that: 
"A~rch _!:?J a client, a ~lient's living gua! ters, 
or property may be made at any_ time, ... if there 
are "t easonable grouna s '' to beli eve that the quar-
ters ~r pro~e?ty contain contraband." HHS 328.21; 
see Resp Brief 3 (text of s~atute). 
In 1983, a supervisor for the State Bureau of Proba-
tion, one Michael Lew, was informed by a local policeman 
that petr "may have had guns" at his residence, in violation -------..-
of the terms of his probation. Lew and a second probation 
officer went to Griffin's apartment to investigate, accompa-
nied by three policemen who were to provide protection 
should petr resist. Upon arrival, the probation officers 
knocked, identified themselves, and informed petr that they 
were there to search the apartment. The search uncovered a 
small bag of marijuana and a istol. Griffin was arrested 
and charged with possession of a handgun by a felon ( petr 
previously had been convicted of a serious drug offense). 
Before trial Griffin moved to suppress the gun, arguing 
that the probation officers were required to obtain a war-
rant before searching a private home. The tc denied the 
motion, and petr eventually was convicted and sentenced to 




that the warrant requirement does not apply when the horne 
belongs to a person on probation. J.A. 77. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that 
"by its nature, probation places limitations on the liberty 
and privacy rights of probationers, and these limitations ------ -------~ 
justify an exception to the warrant requirement." Id., 100. 
The court found that if probation officers were required to 
obtain a warrant before searching, it would significantly 
impair their ability to supervise the probationer's conduct. 
The court also found that the unique characteristics of pro-
bation justified the State's decision to lower the degree of 
suspicion required, from "probable cause" to "reasonable 
grounds" to believe that probationer possessed contraband. 
Id., at 113. Finally, the court concluded that on these 
facts, the tip by the police provided reasonable grounds for ~~ ~ 
--- ~ .......,"'Dl';ga; 
the search. 
There were two dissenting opinions. Justice Abrahamson ~ 
agreed that the State could allow searches based on mere 
reasonable suspicion, but argued that a warrant still should ~ _ 
.u 
be required. She claimed that the warrant requirement wou
not interfere with the probation officers' supervisory du-~~ 
ties but would provide some protection for the probationer. ~;L­
Justice Bablitch also dissented, claiming that here the of-~~ 
ficers did not have reasonable grounds to search. 
This Court granted cert. (WB, BRW, HAB, LFP) to resolve 
a conflict among state and federal courts. The Wisconsin ----court had recognized that its decision was consistent with 
, 
the majority view on this issue, although it acknowledged 
that several cases had reached a contrary conclusion. See 
id., 106-107 (listing cases). 
II. DISCUSSION 
Griffin challenges three aspects of the ruling below. 
First, he claims that the probation officers should have 
been required to obtain a warrant before searching the 
apartment. Second, even if there is no warrant requirement, 
it was error to allow the search based on a standard lower 
than probable cause. Finally, the information available to 
the probation officers in this case did not satisfy either 
the probable cause or the reasonable suspicion standard. 
A. Prerequisites for a Search 
The most important question is whether the probation 
officers were required to obtain a warrant and/or have prob-
able cause before conducting the search. Griffin's best 
argument is that both should be required because the search 
took place in a private home. This type of search not only 
interferes with the probationer's privacy interests, but 
also with those of his family and friends who share the 
home. This Court has made it clear that "physical entry of 
the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the 
4th amendment is directed," United States v. United States 
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972), and that "[a]bsent 
exigent circumstances, th[e] threshold [of a home] may not 
reasonably be crossed without a war rant." Payton v. New 
4. 
, 
York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). Here the State has not even 
"?u) 
alleged that there were exigent circumstances. Instead, 
'\.. ..... -- -
petr argues, the Wisconsin court created an exception out of 
whole cloth, based solely on the view that petr's probation-
ary status justified the lower level of protection. 
Griffin argues that there is no support in this Court's 
cases for this novel exception. Unlike other exigent cir-
cumstances, the fact that petr is on probation does not ere---------------
ate the need for immediate, warrantless action to prevent an 
See Welsh v. United 
States, 466 u.s. 740, 749-750 (1984) ("the police bear a 
heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need 
that might justify warrantless searches or arrests" (empha-
sis added)). The lack of urgency in this case is evident 
from the fact that Mr. Lew waited several hours after re-
ceiving the tip before carrying out the search. 
Griffin concedes that this Court also has recognized 
exceptions to the warrant requirement that are not based on 
exigent circumstances. But he claims that the search of a 
probationer's fails to meet the criteria for creating 
such an exception. In Camera v. United States, 387 u.s. 
523, (1967), the Court stated: 
"In assessing whether the public interest demands 
creation of a general exception to the ... warrant 
requirement, the question is not whether the pub-
lic interest justifi~s the type of search in ques-
tion, but whether - the authority to search should 
be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends 
in part upon · whether ·the burden of obtaining a 
warrant is likely - to frustrate the governmental 
purpose behind .~he search." Id., at 533. 
5. 
6. 
See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) 
(citing Camera test with approval). In this type of case, 
Griffin argues, it would not place any burden on the proba-
------------------------------------tion officers to obtain a warrant before searching. Even 
though the officers might have good reasons for believing 
that petr possessed contraband, it would not have unduly 
delayed the search or created a risk that the contraband 
would be destroyed. The only added burden would be that the 
probation officers would have to explain the basis for their 
suspicion to a magistrate, thus deterring searches that are 
designed to harass, or used as a pretext for routine crimi-
nal investigations. 
Griffin also claims that even if a warrant is not nee- ~~ ~ 
essary, the 4th amendment still requires that the search be 
based on probable cause. -- In other cases where this Court has permitted warrantless searches, it normally continues to 
demand that the police meet the probable cause standard. 
See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 u.s. 42 (1970) (police 
need probable cause for warrantless search of an automo-
bile) . On the other hand, in those cases where the Court 
has allowed searches based on less than probable cause, the 
searches tend to be both necessary to meet a crucial state 
need, and also quite limited in scope. ~ See, e.g., Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 u.s. 1 (1969); United States v. ~rignoni-Ponce, 
442 U.S. 873, 880-881 (1975) (LFP opinion, permitting brief 
stops of cars near Mexican border if officers have reason-
able suspicion that they contain illegal aliens). These 
7. 
decisions clearly are distinguishable, given that here the 
probation officers conducted a generalized search of petr's 
entire apartment. 
I am partially persuaded by these arguments. I agree 
that warrantless searches of a horne should be presumptively 
unconstitutional, and that the warrant requirement normally 
will not impose such a heavy burden on probation officers 
that it would frustrate the purpose of the search. And 
while there is no direct support in this Court's precedent 
for the decision below, the State and the SG (as amicus) 
nevertheless claim that the Wisconsin court was justified in 
creating an exception for a probationers. They argue that 
the legal status of a person on probation is sufficiently 
different from those of other citizens to justify different 
4th amendment treatment. 
First, the State correctly points out that a probation- ~~ 
er has a lower expectation of privacy than others. By defi-
nition, petr has been convicted of a crime, and although he 
is not in prison, he is considered "in custody" under Wis-
consin law. Wis. Stat. Ann. §973.10. In exchange for not 
being imprisoned, a probationer may be subject to all sorts 
of limitations that would be unconstitutional if applied to 
non-probationers. He may be ordered to live in certain 
places, avoid associating with certain people, refrain from 
certain types of occupations, undergo periodic physical or 
psychological testing, and seek permission to leave the ju-
risdiction. See SG Brief 15. Significantly, the probation-
8. 
er also may be subject to periodic, unannounced home visits 
by his probation officer, who must carefully scrutinize the 
probationer's conduct to make sure that he complies with the 
terms imposed by the trial court. Cf., Petr Brief 19 ( ac- ~/-.;. 
y' 
knowledging _ !h~~ rantless home visits a .:.=_ permissible). 
Simply because a probationer has a lower expectation of 
privacy, of course, does not mean a fortiori that the State 
is excused from the warrant requirement. The State admits 
that a probationer is entitled to those 4th amendment rights 
that are not fundamentally inconsistent with his special 
legal status. Therefore, the State's second argument is 
that warrantless searches based on reasonable suspicion 
serve an important state function, because they are an in-
dispensable part of the probation officer's authority to 
supervise the probationer. The claims that state and 
federrl probation -~a erve two purposes: assist the reha-
bilitation of the offender, and protect society from further 
crime. He makes a persuasive argument that both of these 
goals are furthered by allowing warrantless searches. If 
the probationer knows that his supervising officer may make 
an unannounced search at any time, he will be less tempted 
to violate the terms of his parole by having contraband at 
his residence. 
(CAll 1982). 
See Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1367 
If the State were prohibited from searching 
until it had probable cause, it would be easier for the pro-
bationer to avoid detection, and thus easier to drift back 
into a pattern of crime by bringing drugs or weapons into 
9 . 
his home. The fear of discovery, it is argued, helps chan-
nel the offender's energy into more rehabilitative activi-
ties. 
The need to spot criminal tendencies before they 
develope clearly is a significant one. The SG notes that a 
recent Rand Corp. study revealed that over half the proba-~ 
tioners in California were charged with crimes within 40 
months of being sentenced, and over two-thirds were rear-
rested. The State claims that this high recidivist rate 
provides ample justification for a state statute that condi-
tions a defendant's release on his willingness to accept a 
diminution of 4th amendment rights. If the States are not 
allowed to impose these conditions, it is argued, trial 
judges will face the difficult choice of sending an offender 
to prison who otherwise might have received parole, see 
United States v. Consuelo-Gonzales, 521 F. 2d 259, 266 (CAS 
1975), or granting parole, knowing that it will be difficult 
for the probation department to supervise the terms of the 
release. 
I therefore think the State is correct in asserting ~-s­
that "reasonable grounds" is a more appropriate standard in ~ 
this type of case than probable cause. But I am less con-
vinced that the n e also justifies an excep-
tion to the because the State presents /3 t-1--
c.,~l­
little evidence that it would be an undue burden to obtain a ~~ 
warrant before searching. The fact that a search may be ~~ 
w/'D 
carried out on less than probable cause certainly does not
c.~ 
10. 
prevent this Cour~n:isting that the warrant require-
ment be honored. See Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S.~ 
307 ( 1978) (prohibiting warrantless searches of commercial - ~. 
premises under OSHA) . Since time often is not of the e s- /-t.r /Je._ 
~ 
sence in searches of a probationer's residence, and since 
the "reasonable grounds" standard will not be a significant 
barrier to obtaining warrants when they are needed, I think 
the best result is to retain the warrant requirement for 
this type of search. 
I recognize, however, that there are legitimate argu-
ments for disposing of the warrant requirement entirely. I 
suspect t~there 1s less reason to fear that probation 
officers will abuse the right to search than if the police 
were given this power. Probation officers normally will 
have little reason to harass or intimidate a probationer, 
given that most officers probably do not have enough time to 
handle their regular case work. Moreover, the officers are 
not given unbridled discretion in deciding when to search; , 
the Wisconsin statute provides relatively detailed guide-
lines to instruct probation officers on when "reasonable 
grounds" are present. See HHS 328.21(7); see also §.21(5) 
("Field staff shall strive to preserve the dignity of eli-
ents in all searches conducted under this section"). The 
statute also requires that the officers give probationers 
advanced notice of the searches "whenever feasible," ( al -- 7 
though it is hard to imagine that it will ever be feasible J ~ 
to give notice for contraband searches). Finally, although 
the state does not advance the argument, it is likely that 
the warrant requirement could frustrate the state interest 
in conducting frequent searches. If a probation officer 
hopes to deter criminal conduct by conducting several 
searches in a single day or week, inevitably he will end up 
spending most of his time preparing warrant affidavits and 
appearing before a magistrates. (This problem is worse for 
federal probation officers, who cannot obtain warrants at 
all, Fed R. Crim. P. 41(a), (h), and therefore would have to 
depend on the assistance of law enforcement personnel.) 
Thus, while I think the warrant requirement is preferable, 
it may be that the minuscule benefits of requiring a warrant 
are outweighed by the interference it creates. 
B. Were There Reasonable Grounds Here? 
Griffin's final claim is that even if the probation 
officer only needed 
J l 
reasonable • • 1-.\ t SUSplClOn 0 search, the 
standard was not met in this case. The tip concerning Grif-
fin's possession of the gun was given by an unidentified 
source to the police officer, who then relayed it to the 
probation department. There was no attempt to check the 
reliability of the information, nor was it determined that 
the tipster had given truthful information in the past. 
Moreover, the tip itself was ambiguous; it simply stated 
-that petr "may have had" guns in his apartment. 
I agree that this information, standing alone, provides 
a questionable basis for the search. Nevertheless, the 







lj ~ ..... 
~ 
~~~~ 
standard, and there is no reason to disturb that finding 
here. The police officer who took the tip had enough confi-
dence in the information to pass it on, and it was reason-
able for the probation officer to rely on the policeman's 
word. Moreover, it seems likely that most of the informa-
tion gathered by probation officers concerning the people 
they supervise will be in the form of anonymous tips and 
second-hand data. It would interfere with the officers' 
ability to perform their jobs if this Court requires the 
same type of source verification from probation officers 
that it requires of the police. 
III. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION 
Wisconsin has created a detailed statutory system that 
allows warrantless searches of probationers' homes based on 
l ... 
a probation officers reasonable suspicion that a person pos-
l-1 \l 
sesses contraband. I agree that probable cause should not 
1 ------- - -=-






- 1.-t.., ~ 
the probationers and the specific need to supervise closely 
......,__~~ ., 
I would prefer that the~
probation officers be required to obtain a warrant before  11 
those who have committed crimes. 
searching, given that a home is entitled to the highest lev-
el of 4th amendment protections. Accordingly, I suggest 





I recommend that the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court be affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
April 16, 1987 
To: Justice 
From: Andy 
Re: 86-5324, Griffin v. Wisconsin; supplement to the bench 
memo (to be argued Monday, April 20, 1987). 
In looking over you comments on my bench memo in this case, 
I noticed that I was not clear in explaining my recommendation. 
I concluded tbat probation officials did not need probable cause ____ __...., 
to search a probationer's home, but that it nevertheless might be 
preferable to retain the warrant requirement. You wondered 
whether it was rational to require a warrant, since in virtually 
all of our cases warrants can only issue on a showing of probable 
cause. 
My recommendation was based largely on 
() hf~arshall v. ~arlow's, 436 u.s. 407 (1978). 
an analogy to 
In that case the 
----- Court . refused to permit warrantless searches of business premises 
by OSHA inspectors. We retained the warrant requirement even 
though the standard needed to justify the search was only 
II 
reasonable suspicion, not probable cause. I though that the same 
requirements could be applied to Griffin: protect the 
government's interest by permitting it to search based on 
reasonable suspicion, but protect the probationer from abusive 
searches by demanding that the officials get an administrative-
type warrant. 
I have done more research since writing the bench memo. 
Although in some ways I still think it would be useful to keep a 
"reasonable suspicion" warrant requirement, I realize that Barlow 
has not been widely cited as a new approach to analyzing these 
cases. I think it would probably create confusion to separate 
the warrant requirement from probable cause, and would require 
non-police officers to develop expertise in an area that already 
is quite complex. So rather than affirm in part and reverse in 
part as recommended before, I now recommend that the decision of 
the Wisconsin S. Ct. be affirmed in full. 
/ 
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From: Justice Scalia 
.lJUN 1 f 
Circulated: 987 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 86-5324 
JOSEPH G. GRIFFIN, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF WISCONSIN 
[June -, 1987] 
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner Joseph Griffin, who was on probation, had his 
home searched by probation officers acting without a war-
rant. The officers found a gun that later served as the basis 
of Griffin's conviction of a state-law weapons offense. We 
granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1986), to consider 
whether this search violated the Fourth Amendment. 
I 
On September 4, 1980, Griffin, who had previouslY b~n 
convicted of a felony, was convicted in Wisconsin state court 
of resistmg arrest, disorderly conduct, and obstructing an 
officer. He was placed on probation. 
Wisconsin law puts probationers in the legal custody of the 
State Department of Health and Social Services. Sec. 
973.10(1), Wis. Stats. (1985). That law also provides that 
"imposition of probation ... shall subject the defendant to 
. . . conditions set by the court and rules and regulations 
established by the department." Ibid. One of the Depart- __ ... 1'111.. ~ 
ment's regulations permits any probation officer to search a f(..affv----
probatione?Shome without a warrant as long as his su ervi-
sor approves and as1 ong as there are ' easona e ground ' to 
believe there is contraband-including any Item t at the pro-
bationer cannot possess under the probation conditions-in 
86-5324-0 PINI 0 N 
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the home. §§ 328.21(4), 328.16(1), Wis. Adm. Code. 1 The 
rule directs an officer to consider a variety of factors in deter-
mining whether "reasonable grounds" exist, among which are 
information provided by an informant, the reliability and 
specificity of that information, the reliability of the informant 
(including whether the informant has any incentive to supply 
inaccurate information), the officer's own experience with the 
probationer, and the "need to verify compliance with rules of 
supervision and state and federal law." § 328.21(7). An-
other regulation makes it a violation of the terms of probation 
to refuse to consent to a home search. § 328.04(3)(k). And 
still another forbids a probationer to possess a firearm 
without advance approval from a probation officer. 
§ 328.04(3)(j). 
On April 5, 1983, while Griffin was still on probation, 
Michael Lew, the supervisor of Griffin's probation officer, 
received information from a 
1 
detective' on the Beloit Police 
Department tha! there were Qr m1ght be guns in Griffin's 
apartment. Unaole to secure the assistance of Griffin's own 
probation officer, Lew, accompanied by another probation 
officer and three plainclothes policemen, went to the apart-
ment. When Griffin answered the door, Lew told him who 
they were and informed him that they were going to search 
his home. During the subsequent search-carried out en-
tirely by the probation officers under the authority of Wis-
consin's probation regulations-they found a handgun. 
Griffin was charged with possession of a firearm by a con-
victed felon, which is itself a ~elo~. Sec. 941.29(2), Wis. 
Stats. (1986). He moved to suppress the evidence seized 
during the search. The trial court denied the motion, con-
'Section HSS 328 was promulgated in December 1981 and became effec-
tive on January 1, 1982. Effective May 1, 1986, Section HSS 328.21 was 
repealed and repromulgated with somewhat different numbering and with-
out relevant substantive changes. See Gr1tfin v. State, 388 N. W. 2d 535, 
542 n. 7 (Wis. 1986). This opinion will cite the old version of § 328.21, 
which was in effect at the time of the search. 
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eluding that no warrant was necessary and that the search 
was reasonable. A jury convicted Griffin of the firearms vi-
olation, and he was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. 
The conviction was affirmed by the Wisconsin Court of Ap-
peals, State v. Griffin, 376 N. W. 2d 62 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985). 
On further appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court again af-
firmed. It found denial of the suppression motion proper be-
cause probation diminishes a grobationer's reasonable expec-
tat!Qp. of_wi,yacy-so that a probation officer may, consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment, search a probationer's home 
without a warrant, and with only "reasonable grounds" (not 
probable cause) to believe that contraband is present. It 
held that the "reasonable grounds" standard of Wisconsin's 
search regulation satisfied this "reasonable grounds" stand-
ard of the federal Constitution, and that the detective's tip 
established. "reasonable grounds" within the meaning of the 
regulation, since it came from someone who had no reason to 
supply inaccurate information, specifically identified Griffin, 
and suggested a need to verify Griffin!s compliance with state 
law. State v. Griffin, 388 N. W. 2d 535, 539-544 (1986). 
II 
We think the Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly con- , 
eluded that this warrantless search did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. To reach that result, however, we find it un-
necessar to emBrace the new princlple of la tTiat court 
adopte_!L Griffin a een conv1c e o a crime, and the 
search was carried out pursuant to a regulation promulgated 
by the corrections officials to whose custody he had been 
committed. It is enough to find that regulation valid under 
the analysis our cases have applied to other regulations alleg-
edly infringing the constitutional rights of those lawfully 
remanded to the custody of corrections officials. 
A 
With regard to those convicted of crimes and sentenced to 
prison, the Court has long recognized that, although not all 
? 
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constitutional protections are forfeit, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U. S. 520, 545 (1979), some constitutional rights are signifi-
cantly limited, not only as an inevitable consequence of incar-
ceration but also to enable corrections authorities reasonably 
to pursue such valid objectives as rehabilitation and security. 
Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 285 (1948); Pell v. Pro-
cunier, 417 U. S. 817, 822-823 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 
416 U. S. 392, 412-413 (1974). "There must be," we have 
said, "mutual accommodation between institutional needs 
and objectives" and constitutional rights, Wolffv. McDaniel, 
418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974), including, perhaps most obviously, 
rights under the Fourth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 
supra, at 555-560 (upholding jail policy requiring unan-
nounced "shakedown" inspections and strip searches). And 
we have held, therefore, that a prison regulation is not to be 
judged under the "heightened scrutiny" usually applied to 
alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights, 
but instead under a standard of "reasonableness," Turner v. 
Safley, -- U. S. ---, -- (1987), validating the regula-
tion "if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests." O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, -- U. S. --, 
-- (1987) (quoting Turner, at --). 
We think this mode of analysis (though not, of course, the 
precise results it produces) equally applicable to regulations 
that allegedly impinge on the constitutional rights of proba-
tioners. ~robation, like prison, is "a form of criminal sanc- ~ 
tion imposed by a court upon an offender after verdict, find-
ing, or plea of guilty." G. Killinger et al., Probation and 
Parole in the Criminal Justice System 14 (1976). Probation 
is simply one point (or, more accurately, one set of points) on 
a continuum of possible punishments ranging from solitary 
confinement in a maximum security facility to a few hours of 
mandatory community service. A number of different op-
tions lie between those extremes, including confinement in a 
medium or minimum security facility, work-release pro-
grams, "halfway houses," and probation-which can itself be 
86-5324-0PINION 
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more or less confining depending upon the number and sever-
ity of restrictions imposed. To a greater or lesser degree, 
however, it is always true of probationers (as we have said it 
to be true of parolees) that they do not enjoy "the absolute 
liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only ... condi-
tional liberty properly dependent on observance of special 
[probation] restrictions." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 
471, 480 (1972). 
As already noted, Griffin was committed to the legal cus-
tody of the Wisconsin State Department of Health and Social 
Services, and was made "subject ... to ... rules and regula-
tions established by the department." Sec. 973.10(1), Wis. 
Stats. (1985). The corrections officials of that department 
pursue many of the same objectives as the corrections offi-
cials of a prison system, including rehabilitation and protec-
tion of the community. See State ex rel. Niederer v. Cady, 
240 N. W. 2d 626, 633 (Wis. 1976) (discussing objectives of 
parole). We see no reason why the same considerations that 
induced us to adopt a "reasonableness" standard for assessing 
the constitutionality or regulab qns promUigated by prison 
officials would not call for a similar standard here-consider-
ations ranging from separation·of powers and federalism c.Qg-
~ to an· appropriate respect for the expert judgment of 
corrections officials with regard to the needs of the penal sys-
tem. See, e. g., Turner, at--; O'Lone, at--; Procunier 
v. Martinez, supra, at 405; Jones v. North Carolina Prison-
ers' Union, 433 U. S. 119, 137 (1977) (Burger, C. J., 
concurring). 
The "reasonableness" standard, of course, automatically 
takes account of relevant differences that exist between pro-
bation and prison confinement. Even in the prison context 
alone, we have recognized that this standard produces vary-
ing results depending upon "the nature of the regime to 
which [prisoners] have been lawfully committed." Wolff v. 
McDaniel, supra, at 556. See O'Lone, at -- (restriction 
upon religious liberty reasonable in light of outdoor-work 
86-5324-0PINION 
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regimen dictated by crowded conditions in particular prison); 
Turner, at -- (inmate mail restrictions justified by exist-
ence of convict gangs in particular prison system). Thus, 
some prison regulations we have approved will not be con-
stitutionally applicable to probationers. It is difficult to 
envision, for example, circumstances that would validate, in 
the probation context, the restrictions on inmate mail we up-
held in Turner. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 483 
(1972) (holding that due process requires limited hearing be-
fore parole may be revoked since, although parolee is for-
mally "in custody," summary decisionmaking is not as impor-
tant in that setting as in prison). 
B 
Having determined that the r~asonableness analysis set 
forth in Turner and O'Lone provides the proper framework, 
we turn to its application to the facts of the present case. 
The manner of that analysis has been as follows: As a thresh:-
old matter, we have required that the regulation at issue 
have "a logical connection to legitimate governmental inter-
ests invoked to justify it." O'Lone, at-- (citing Turner, at 
--). If it does, we have proceeded to a consideration of 
the proportionality between, on the one hand, the nature and 
degree of restriction upon the prisoner's liberty and, on the 
other, the importance of that restriction to the public inter-
est. With regard to the latter, we have accorded consider-
able deference to the "considered judgment" of corrections 
officials, O'Lone, at-- (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 
562); see also Turner, at --, though we have not been pre-
pared to ignore the existence of "obvious, easy alternatives" 
to their restrictive policies, O'Lone, at-- (quoting Turner, 
at-). 
In applying this mode of ana)ysis here, we must of course 
take the regulation as it has been interpreted by state correc-
tio'i'rs officials and state courts. As already noted, the Wis-
consi n Supreme Court-the ultimate authority on issues of 
86-5324-0PINION 
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Wisconsin law-has held that a tip from a police detective I 
that Griffin "had" or "may have had" an illegal weapon at his 
home constituted "reasonable grounds" under the regulation. 
See 388 N. W. 2d, at 544. Whether or not we would choose 
to interpret a similarly worded federal regulation in that 
fashion, we are bound by the state court's interpretation, 
which is relevant to our constitutional analysis only insofar as 
it fixes the meaning of the regulation. 2 
Whatever may be the outer limits established by our 
"reasonablen~s'' test fo~f corrections 
official:S're~, Wisconsin's search re lation is well 
wit~~m. Permitting searc es on "reasonable grounds" 
(even as Wisconsin has defined them) obviously has a logical 
connection to the quite legitimate objective of assuring that 
the probationer is complying with the terms of his probation, 
including the requirement that he not violate other Wisconsin 
laws, thereby assuring that the probation serves as a period 
of genuine rehabilitation, and that the community is not 
harmed by the probationer's being at large. Pursuit of this 
objective justifies the State in exercising a degree of surveil-
lance and supervision over probationers beyond what it can 
properly apply to others who are not incarcerated. We 
must, therefore, determine whether there is a reasonable 
2 If the regulation in question established a standard of conduct to which ? 
the probationer had to conform on pain of penalty-e. g., a restriction on 
his movements-the state court could not constitutionally adopt so unnatu-
ral an interpretation of the language that the regulation would fail to pro-
vide adequate notice. Cf. Kolendet· v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 357-358 
(1983); Lambert v. CaLU'ornia, 355 U. S. 225, 228 (1957). That is not an 
issue here since, even though the petitioner would be in violation of his pro-
bation conditions (and subject to the penalties that entails) if he failed to 
consent to any search that the regulation authorized, see HSS 328.04(3)(k), 
nothing in the regulation or elsewhere required him to be advised, at the 
time of the request for search, what the probation officer's "reasonable 
grounds" were, any more than the ordinary citizen has to be notified of the 
grounds for "probable cause" or "exigent circumstances" searches before 
they may be undertaken. 
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proportionality between the burden of the restriction Wis-
consin's search regulation imposes upon normal civil liberties 
and (giving due weight to the considered judgment of Wis-
consin's corrections officials) its utility in furthering the goal 
of Wisconsin's probation system. 
Wisconsin's search regulations bring the probationer's I 
righti-Ssthose which ordinary citizens enjoy in two re- L_ 
spect . Fir they dispense with the warrant requirement ~ -
that is · arily a conO!tiott of F'ourth AmendmeiR reason-
ableness. See, e. g., Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573,  
586 (1980). That requirement would obviously interfere to J 
an appreciable degree with the probation system, setting up 
a magistrate rather than the probation officer as the judge of 
how close a supervision the probationer requires. By way of 
analogy, one might contemplate how parental custodial au-
thority· would be impaired by requiring judicial approval for 
search of a minor child's room. And on the other side of the 
equation-the effect of dispensing with a warrant upon the 
probationer: Although a probation officer is not an impartial 
magistrate, neither is he the police officer who normally con-
ducts searches against the ordinary citizen. He is an em-
ployee of the State De artment of Health and So erv1ces 
who, e assure y charged with protecting the public in-
terest, is also supposed to have in mind the welfare of the 
pro~go~r (who ui tfie regufad ons is called a "client," HSS 
§ 32 . 3(5)). The applicable regulations require him, for ex-
ample, to "[p]rovid[e] individualized counseling designed to 
foster growth and development of the client as necessary," 
HSS § 328.04(2)(i), and "[m]onitor[] the client's progress 
where services are provided by another agency and evalu-
at[e] the need for continuation of the services," HSS 
§ 328.04(2)(o). In such a setting, we think it reasonable to ~ 
dispense with the warrant re uir ment. - () 
The econ in which the Wisconsin regulation 
dispenses W1 mary Fourth Amendment requirements is 
that it demands only a standard of "reasonable grounds" to 
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justify a search. That lies somewhere between the standard 
of "probable cause" that citizens who are not under senten ce 
for crime enJoy, and the standard of no cause that we have 
implicitly approvedTn the prison context , se?! Bell v. Wolfiish, 
supra, at 555-557 (approving random "shakedown" 
searches); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (pris-
oners have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their 
prison cells). It is most unlikely that the unauthenticated tip 
of a police officer-bearing, as far as the record shows, no 
indication whether its basis was first-hand knowledge or, if 
not, whether the first-hand source was reliable, and merely 
stating that Griffin "had or might have" guns in his residence, 
not that he certainly had them-would support the issuance 
of a warrant in an ordinary case. Once again, however, this 
is not an ordinary case, by reason of the continuing relation-
ship that exists between the probation agency and the proba-
tioner. The principal difference is well reflected in the regu-
lation specifying what is to be considered "[i]n deciding 
whether there are reasonable grounds to believe ... a cli-
ent's living quarters or property contain contraband," HSS 
§ 328.21(7). The factors include not only the usual elements 
that a police officer or ~ag!st;ate would consider, such as the 
detail and consistency of the information suggesting the pres-
ence of contraband and the reliability and motivation to dis-
semble of the informant, HSS § 328.21(7)(c), (d); but also 
"[i]nformation provided by the client which is relevant to 
whether the c ient possesses contra an ,' an " t]he experi-
en~~client or in a similar circum-
stance." HSS §328.21(7)(f), (g). We deal with a situation, 
in other words, in which there is an ~ng~tionship-­
and one that is not, or at least not entirefy, adversarial-be-
tween the object of the search and the decisionmaker. 
In such circumstances it is both unrealistic, and destructive 
of the whole object of the continuing probation relationship, 
to insist upon the same degree of demonstrable reliability of 
particular items of supporting data, and upon the same de-
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gree of certainty of violation, as is required in other contexts. 
The probation agency must be able to proceed on the basis of 
its entire experience with the probationer, and to assess 
probabilities in the light of its knowledge of his life, character 
and circumstances. This kind of personal evaluation is 
reviewable only with great difficulty, if at all, by courts of 
law. To allow adequate play for such factors, we think it 
reasonable to permit information provided by a police officer, 
whether or not on the basis of first-hand knowledge, to sup-
port a probationer search. The same conclusion is suggested 
by the fact that the police may be unwilling to disclose their 
confidential sources to probation personnel. For the same 
reason, and also because it is the very assumption of the insti-
tution of probation that the probationer is in need of rehabili-
tation and is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate 
the law, we think it enough if the information provided indi-
cates, as it did here, only the likelihood ("had or might have 
gun;;") of facts justifying the search. 
Finally, we see no readily available alternative to warrant-
less searches based on reasonable grounds (as that term has 
been interpreted by Wisconsin corrections officials and the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court in the circumstances of this case) 
that would as effectively accomplish the purposes of the pro-
bation system. Accordingly, we conclude that the regula-
tion as applied satisfies the constitutional standard of 
reasonableness. 
* * * 
The search of Griffin's residence was "reasonable" within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it was con-
ducted pursuant to a valid regulation governing probation-
ers. This conclusion makes it-;;nnecessary to consider 
whether, as the court below held and the State urges, any 
search of a probationer's home by a probation officer is lawful 
when there are "reasonable grounds" to believe contraband is 
present. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 
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Dear Nino: 
Because I detect some tension between your 
analysis of the custodial character of parole and the 
Court's approach in Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 u.s. 
492, and because I do not agree with your implicit 
holding that a search based on nothing more than a 
police officer's "hunch" is reasonable, I shall wait 
to see what Harry writes in dissent. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Blackmun 
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~ To: Justice 
From: Andy 
Powell 
Re: 86-5324, Griffin v. United States 
June 2, 
Justice Scalia has circulated his draft opinion for the 
Court in this April case. The result is consistent with your 
1987 
vote at Conference. The reasoning is quite broad in places: he 
says, for example, that the "reasonableness" standard applies to 
any type of regulation imposed on anyone who has been committed 
to the custody of the state AG, regardless of whether the 
defendant is in jail, on probation, parole, or work-release. 
Ultimately, however, his holding is narrow. He simply decides 
that this particular search was permissible because it was 
conducted pursuant to a valid state regulation. He does not hold 
that any warrantless search of a probationer's home will be 
considered reasonable in the absence of a regulation. 
I have other, minor quibbles about the way the opinion is 
written (see, e.g., the analogy at the middle of page 8), but 
they are not worth fighting about. Unless you are concerned 
about the scope of the opinion, I recommend that you join. 
June 11, 1987 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Andy 
Re: 86-5324, Griffin v. Wisconsin 
You might recall that we discussed this case briefly after 
Justice Scalia circulated his draft opinion. At the time you 
~ were uneasy about the analysis, although satisfied with the 
d _,-result. The outcome is consistent with your Conference vote 
it is permissible for a state statute to allow the warrantless 
search of a probationers home. But as you noted, parts of the 
analysis are quite broad. 
Justice Scalia's states that any person who is serving a 
sentence for a crime may be required to relinquish his 
constitutional rights if there is a "reasonable" connection 
between a state penological interest and the restriction. He 
arrives at this conclusion by looking to our "prisoners' rights" 
cases such as Turner v. Safley (Justice O'Connor's opinion from 
this term that you joined). Justice Scalia reasons that since we 
give great deference to the warden on how to run the prison, we 
logically should give similar deference to parole officials, 
probation officers, or any other official responsible for 
punishment and rehabilitation. Of course, the ~ of 
restriction that is considered reasonable will vary according the 
degree of "confinement" to which you are subject -- the mail 
restriction upheld in Safley would be unreasonable if applied to 
a person on parole -- but Justice Scalia concludes that the 
standard for evaluation constitutional deprivations should be the 
same regardless of whether the person is sentenced to perform 
community service or is confined in Attica. 
There are two problems with this approach. First, it does 
not logically follow that we sho~ld lower the standard of 
scrutiny for probationers simply because we do so for prisoners. 
One reason we are willing to give such great deference to wardens 
is that prisons are a unique, self-contained society, and judges 
are ill-suited for making the day-to-day decisions necessary to 
run them. People on probation, however, are by definition part 
of the mainstream; judges are more capable of deciding whether a 
warrantless search is necessary for probationers than for 
prisoners, and thus there is less reason for deferring to 
-------.... - -
corrections officials. In fact, because the "reasonableness" ----- --......__ 
standard is an exception to the usual rule of strict scrutiny, a 
strong argument could be made that Justice Scalia has swept too 
broadly in establishing a standard for all convicts that 
originally was intended to apply only in prisons. 
The c~pe- 0~ t is the second problem. we have 
not considered a great number of similar cases involving 
constitutional deprivations of non-prisoners convicted of crimes 
(perhaps they just don't arise), but taken to extremes, Justice 
Scalia's opinion would apply to all deprivations of any 
constitutional rights for anyone in the custody of the AG. 
Ultimately, this may prove to be the logical rule, but it is not 
necessary to go that far immediately. This case only involves 
the 4th amendment rights of a probationer; the narrowest opinion 
would find that the 4th amendment has less application to 
---~ 
probationers because of the special need to monitor their 
behavior. This narrow approach is less satisfying, in that it -----does not clarify a whole area of law, but it may be more prudent. 
Recommendation: Having said. this, I realize that my concerns 
are quite theoretical, and may be better resolved in law reviews 
rather than the u.s. Reports. Because you agree with the result, 
I think you safely can join Justice Scalia's opinion. But for 
the moment, the better course may be to wait. Justice O'Connor's 
cler~s are concerned about this case, and she may be planning to 
write separately to address the issues mentioned above. If she -does write (I hope to find out from her clerks as soon as they 
know), I would recommend that you wait to see what she has to 
say. If she decides not to write, we then can decide whether to 
add a few words of our own or simply join. 
CHAMI!IERS OF" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
.Ju.prtntt <lfottrl of l4t ~b .Jtatts 
,ru!pnghtn. ~. <lf. 2.0.;t,..;l 
June 3, 1987 
Re: 86-5324 - Griffin v. Wisconsin 
Dear Nino: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely~ 
Justice Scalia 
cc: The Conference 
/ 
.J Ul:>L!Ce nrennan '1' "2_ /P 
Justice White ?.__ 7 _ {/ ~ 
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JOSEPH G. GRIFFIN, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF WISCONSIN 
[June-, 1987] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment. 
I agree with the plurality that the probation condition at 
issue in this case satisfies the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment, and accordingly concur in the judgment. I dis-
agree, however, that the standard adopted in Turner v. 
Safley, 482 U.S.-- (1987) is apposite here. It is true, of j ~ A..--1-~ 
course, that this case, like Turner, involves constitutional , ~/-: A. ~ ~...M .A 
claims by those who have been convicted of crimes andre- L--1...,.-'\ ~- -\....· 
manded to custody of the executive branch. Unlike Turner, ()j. ~ 
however, this case does not involve the kind o mstitutwnaf ' 
concerns raised by the "operational . . . realities of running "tt-~ -1 
a penal institution." Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' v { 
Labor Union, 433 U. S. 119, 126 (1977). These consider- A.. ~ • 
ations were an important reason for the standard adopted in 
Turner, supra, at --, and in my view their absence makes 
that decision inapt to the question at hand. 
Better authority, in my view, for the conclusion reached by 
the Court today is the balancing test announced in Camara v. 
Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967), and recently applied 
by this Court in O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. -- (1987) 
and New Jersey v. T. L. 0., 469 U. S. 325 (1985). In con-
cluding that Camara's balancing analysis offers the most ap-
propriate framework for considering the Fourth Amendment 
claims of those on probation, I would follow !._h~p­
parently taken by the upreme Court O!WiSconsin in · this 
case, see 388 N.· W. 2d 535 86 , an w1dely supported by --
p~· 56t:.--6 
~ 
~ .. ~Us 
"'~ ~  
~~~ 
fU2. 4.) £73 . 
~Ia_-(_ 
~~ 
h.. e:;. 1- .v ; £....., 
~~~~-· 
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other courts and commentators. See, e. g., 4 W. LaFave, 
Search an~.10(c), pp. 136-142 (2d ed. 1987); 
White, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Parolees and Pro-
bationers, 31 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 167 (1969); Note, Extending 
Search-and-Seizure Protection to Parolees in California, 22 
Stan. L. Rev. 129, 137-140 (1969); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F. 
2d 246 (CA9 1975) (en bane); United States v. Consuelo-Gon-
zalez, 521 F. 2d 259 (CA9 1975) (en bane); State v. Earnest, 
293 N. W. 2d 365, 368 (Minn. 1980). The view of these au-
thorities is that a re~eig:hing_of ~heE_a~ce of individual and 
societal interests is appropnateinilglitoh1le0ilg01'iig super-
visiorrandregulation of probationers and parolees in society. 
Under this test, although probable cause is generally re-
quired for any search or seizure, a different standard may be 
appropriate "'[ w ]here a careful balancing of governmental 
and private interests suggests that the public interest is best 
served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness 
that stops short of probable cause.'" O'Connor v. Ortega, 
supra, at -- (quoting New Jersey v. T. L. 0., supra, at 
341). 
Considering first the government's legitimate needs, few 
would disagree that there is a great public interest in close 
supervision of those on probatiorl."" According to a recent 
RAND study of probation in California, for example, over 
half of the persons on probation for felony convictions were 
charged with new crimes within 40 months of being sen-
tenced, and almost two-thirds were rearrested within the 
same period. Petersilia, Probation and Felony Offenders, 49 
Fed. Probation 4, 5 (June 1985). Moreover, over half of 
those on probation were reconvicted, with 18% convicted of 
homicide, rape, weapons offenses, assault, or robbery. ld., 
at 6. Probation-which was "originally intended for offend-
ers who pose little threat to society and were believed to be 
capable of rehabilitation through a productive, supervised life 
in the community," id., at 4-is increasingly used even for 
those convicted of serious felonies. Over one-third of the 
.. 
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Nation's adult probation population consists of those con-
victed of felonies, and the probation population is growing 
more rapidly than the prison population. Ibid. Accord-
ingly, there is a special public interest in maintaining a sys-
tem of close supervision of those on probation. 
Probation supervision would be substantially more diffi-
cult, if possible at all, under a rule requiring probation 
officers to have both probable cause and a warrant before 
conducting a search to ensure compliance with probation con-
ditions. Some potential violations of probation conditions-
such as possession of drugs or firearms in violation of the con-
ditions of probation-can only be detected by searches of the 
probationer's person or home. In some cases, moreover, a 
reduced standard of Fourth Amendment reasonableness is 
necessary to permit early intervention before a probationer 
does damage to himself or society. Indeed, recent research 
suggests that more intensive supervision ·of those on proba-
tion can significantly reduce recidivism. I d., at 9. In 
Camara, this Court refused to require probable cause in the 
traditional sense because "the only effective way to seek uni-
versal compliance with the minimum standards required by 
municipal codes is through routine periodic inspections of all 
structures." 387 U. S., at 535-536. Some probation condi-
tions likewise can be effectively enforced only if probation of-
ficers are permitted to act on evidence that may not satisfy 
the probable-cause standard. The warrant requirement is 
also ill-suited to probation searches. Such a requirement 
would interfere with the ability of probation officials to react 
quickly to evidence of misconduct, see T. L. 0. v. New Jer-
sey; 469 U. S., at 340 (warrant requirement "would unduly 
interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal dis-
ciplinary procedures needed in the schools"), and the delay 
occasioned by a warrant requirement could frustrate the 
need for. an effective, credible deterrent. New York v. Bur-
ger,-- U. S. --, -- (1987); United States v. Biswell, 
406 U. S. 311, 316 (1972). Thus, "special needs, beyond the 
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normal need for law enforcement make the warrant and prob-
able cause requirement impracticable." 469 U. S., at 351 
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment). 
Balanced against this public need, of course, are the proba-
tioners' privacy interests. The instant case involves the I 
search of h~individuals' privacy interests are at 
their greatest. Nonetheless, because of the supervisory na-
ture of probation, a probationer has a lesser privacy interest 
than other members of the public. A term of probation is 
imposed instead of a term of imprisonment, see 18 U. S. C. 
§ 3651 (1982 ed. and Supp. III); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 973.09 
(West 1985 and Supp. 1986), and in return, a probationer 
must comply with often quite stringent conditions that belie 
any claim to the de ee of rivacy shared by those not on pro-
bation. The £ eral probation statu , for example, auth<:>r-
izes an array o con itwns, me u mg: the obligation not 'to 
commit another crime during the period of probation, the ob-
ligation to pursue employment, the duty to avoid certain 
occupations, an obligation to avoid certain places or people, a 
requirement that the probationer spend weekends or nights 
in prison, a requirement that the probationer refrain from ex-
cessive use of alcohol, or any use of a narcotic drug or other 
controlled substance. 18 U. S.C. §3563 (1982 ed., Supp. 
III) (effective Nov. 1, 1987). In light of restrictions such as 
these, probationers cannot legitimately expect the same de-
gree of privacy as law-abiding citizens. 
On balance, I conclude that the standard of Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness applied by the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin is appropriate in the probation context. I further 
agree with the plurality and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
that the search in this case was reasonable. The search was 
initiated by a supervisor in the State Bureau of Probation and 
Parole after he received a telephone call from the local detec-
tive bureau. The supervisor testified that the detective who 
called him "indicated that they had received information that 
Mr. Griffin had in his possession at his residence contraband 
86-5324-CONCUR 
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material." App. 51. Although this information would not 
be adequate to support a finding of probable cause under Illi-
nois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (1983), in my view, it was rea-
sonable for probation officials to rely on information provided 
by law enforcement officials. As stated by the plurality, it 
is essential that probation officials be able to proceed on the 
basis of their entire experience with a probationer, and "it 
[is] reasonable to permit information provided by a police 
officer, whether or not on the basis of first-hand knowledge, 
to support a probationer search." Ante, at 10. I therefore 
concur in the judgment affirming the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~uprtnu QJ1tnd 1tf Urt ~niu~ ~tatt• 
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Dear Harry: 
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f ALTERNATE DRAFT) 
SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 86-5324 
JOSEPH G. GRIFFIN, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN -- ----------._ 
S.D.lc 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF WISCONSIN 
[June 26, 1987] 
JusTICE ScALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner Joseph Griffin, who was on probation, had his 
home searched by probation officers acting without a war-
rant. The officers found a gun that later served as the basis 
of Griffin's conviction of a state-law weapons offense. We 
granted certiorari, 479 U. S. -- (1986), to consider whether 
this search violated the Fourth Amendment. 
I 
On September 4, 1980, Griffin, who had previously been 
convicted of a felony, was convicted in Wisconsin state court 
of resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and obstructing an 
officer. He was placed on probation. 
Wisconsin law puts probationers in the legal custody of the 
State Department of Health and Social Services and renders 
them "subject to ... conditions set by the court and rules 
and regulations established by the department." Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.10(1) (1985). One of the Department's regulations per-
mits any probation officer to search a probationer's home 
without a warrant as long as his supervisor approves and as 
long as there are "reasonable grounds" to believe the pres-
ence of contraband-including any item that the probationer 
cannot possess under the probation conditions. Wis. Admin. 
~~ 
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Code HHS §§ 328.21(4), 328.16(1) (1981). 1 The rule provides 
that an officer should consider a variety of factors in deter-
mining whether "reasonable ·grounds" exist, among which are 
information provided by an informant, the reliability and 
specificity of that information, the reliability of the informant 
(including whether the informant has any incentive to supply 
inaccurate information), the officer's own experience with the 
probationer, and the "need to verify compliance with rules of 
supervision and state and federal law." HHS § 328.21(7). 
Another . regulation makes it a violation of the terms of 
probation to refuse to consent to a home search. HHS 
§ 328.04(3)(k). And still another forbids a probationer to 
possess a firearm without advance approval from a probation 
officer. HHS § 328.04(3)(j). 
On April 5, 1983, while Griffin was still on probation, 
Michael Lew, the supervisor of Griffin's probation officer, 
received information from a detective on the Beloit Police 
Department that there were or might be guns in Griffin's 
_apartment. Unable to secure the assistance of Griffin's own 
probation officer, Lew, accompanied by another probation 
officer and three plainclothes policemen, went to the apart-
ment. When Griffin answered the door, Lew told him who 
they were and informed him that they were going to search 
his home. During the subsequent search-carried out en-
tirely by the probation officers under the authority of Wis-
consin's probation regulation-they found a handgun. 
Griffin was charged with possession of a firearm by a con-
victed felon, which is itself a felony. Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2) 
(Supp. 1986-1987). He moved to suppress the evidence 
seized during the search. The trial court denied the motion, 
' HSS § 328 was promulgated in December 1981 and became effective on 
January 1, 1982. Effective .May 1, 1986, HSS § 328.21 was repealed and 
repromulgated with somewhat different numbering and without relevant 
substantive changes. See Griffin v. State, 131 Wis. 2d 41, 60, n. 7, 388 
N. W. 2d 535, 542, n, 7 (1986). This opinion will cite the old version of 
§ 328.21, which was in effect at the time of the search. 
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concluding that no warrant was necessary and that the 
search was reasonable. A jury convicted Griffin of the fire-
arms violation, and he was sentenced to two years' imprison-
ment. The conviction was affirmed by the Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals, State v. Griffin, 126 Wis. 2d 183, 376 N. W. 2d 62 
(1985). 
On further appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court also af-
firmed. It found denial of the suppression motion proper be-
cause probation diminishes a probationer's reasonable expec-
tation of privacy-so that a probation officer may, consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment, search a probationer's home 
without a warrant, and with only "reasonable grounds" (not 
probable cause) to believe that contraband is present. It · 
held that the "reasonable grounds" standard of Wisconsin's 
search regulation satisfied this "reasonable grounds" stand-
ard of the Federal Constitution, and that the detective's tip 
established "reasonable grounds" within the meaning of the 
regulation, since it came from someone who had no reason to 
supply inaccurate information, specifically identified Griffin, 
and suggested a need to verify Griffin's compliance with state 
law. State v. Griffin, 131 Wis. 2d 41, 52-64, 388 N. W. 2d 
535, 539-544 (1986). 
II 
We think the Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly con-
cluded that this warrantless search did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. To reach that result, however, we find it un-
necessary to embrace a new principle of law, as the Wiscon-
sin court evidently did, that any search of a probationer's 
home by a probation officer satisfies the Fourth Amendment 
as long as the information possessed by the officer satisfies a 
federal "reasonable grounds" standard. As his sentence for 
the commission of a crime, Griffin was committed to the legal 
custody of the Wiscom~in State Department of Health and So-
cial Services, and thereby made subject to that department's 
rules and regulations. The search of Griffin's home satis-
fied the demands of the Fourth Amendment because it was 
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carried out pursuant to a regulation that itself satisfies the 
Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement under well 
established principles. 
A 
A probationer's home, like anyone else's, is protected by 
the Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches be "rea-
sonable." Although we usually require that a search be un-
dertaken only pursuant to a warrant (and thus supported by 
probable cause, as the Constitution says warrants must be), 
see, e. g., Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 586 (1980), we 
have permitted exceptions when "special needs, beyond the 
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and 
probable cause requirement impracticable." New Jersey v. 
T. L . 0., 469 U. S. 325, 351 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in 
the judgment). Thus, we have held that government em-
ployers and supervisors may conduct warrantless, work-re-
lated searches of employees' desks and offices without proba-
ble cause, O'Connor v. Ortega, -- U. S. -- (1987), and 
that school officials may conduct warrantless searches of 
some student property, also without probable cause, New 
Jersey v. T. L. 0., supra. We have also held, for similar 
reasons, that in certain circumstances government investiga-
tors conducting searches pursuant to a regulatory scheme 
need not adhere to the usual warrant or probable cause re-
quirements as long as their searches meet "reasonable legis-
lative or administrative standards." Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U. S. 523, 538 (1967). See New York v. Burger, 
-- U. S. --, -- (1987); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 
594, 602 (1981); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311, 316 
(1972). 
A State's operation of a probation system, like its opera-
tion of a school, government office or prison, or its supervi-
sion of a regulated industry, likewise presents "special 
needs" beyond normal law enforcement that may justify de-
partures from the usual warrant and probable cause require-
ments. Probation, like incarceration, is "a form of criminal 
86-5324-0PINION 
GRIFFIN v. WISCONSIN 5 
sanction imposed by a court upon an offender after verdict, 
finding, or plea of guilty." G. Killinger, H. Kerper, & P. 
Cromwell, Probation and Parole in the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem 14 (1976); see also 18 U. S. C. § 3651 (9182 ed. and Supp. 
III) (probation imposed instead of imprisonment); Wis. Stat. 
Ann. § 973.09 (West 1985 and Supp. 1986) (same). 2 Proba-
tion is simply one point (or, more accurately, one set of 
points) on a continuum of possible punishments ranging from 
solitary confinement in a maximum security facility to a few 
hours of mandatory community service. A number of differ-
ent options lie between those extremes, including confine-
ment in a medium or minimum security facility, work-release 
programs, "halfway houses," and probation-which can itself 
be more or less confining depending upon the number and se-
verity of restrictions imposed. See, e. g. , 18 U.S. C. §3563 
(1982 ed. , Supp. III) (effective Nov. 1, 1987) (probation con-
ditions authorized in federal system include requiring proba-
tioners to avoid commission of other crimes; to pursue em-
ployment; to avoid certain occupations, places, and people; to 
spend evenings or weekends in prison; and to avoid narcotics 
or excessive use of alcohol). To a greater or lesser degree, it 
is always true of probationers (as we have said it to be true of 
parolees) that they do not enjoy "the absolute liberty to 
which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional lib-
erty properly dependent on observance of special [probation] 
restrictions." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 , 480 
(1972). 
These restrictions are meant to assure that the probation 
serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the com-
2 We have recently held that prison regulations allegedly infringing 
Constitutional rights are themselves constitutional as long as they are 
"'reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. ' " O'Lone v. 
Estate of Shabazz,- U. S.-, - (1987) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 
482 U. S. -, - ·- (1987)). We have no occasion in this case to decide 
whether, as a general matter, that test applies to probation regulations as 
well. 
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munity is not harmed by the probationer's being at large. 
See State v. Tarrell, 74 Wis. 2d 746, 653-654, 247 N. W. 2d 
696, 700 (1976). These same goals require and justify the ex-
ercise of supervision to assure that the restrictions are in fact 
observed. Recent research suggests that more intensive su-
pervision can reduce recidivism, see Petersilia, Probation 
and Felony Offenders, 49 Fed. Probation 9 (June 1985), and 
the importance of supervision has grown as probation has be-
come an increasingly common sentence for those convicted of 
serious crimes, see id., at 4. Supervision, then, is a "special 
need" of the State permitting a degree of impingement upon 
privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the pub-
lic at large. That permissible degree is not unlimited, how-
ever, so we next turn to whether it has been exceeded here. 
B 
In determining whether the "special needs" of its probation 
system justify Wisconsin's search regulation, we must take 
that regulation as it has been interpreted by state corrections 
officials and state courts. As already noted, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court-the ultimate authority on issues of Wiscon-
sin law-has held that a tip from a police detective that Grif-
fin "had" or "may have had" an illegal weapon at his home 
constituted the requisite "reasonable grounds." See 131 
Wis. 2d, at 64, 388 N. W. 2d, at 544. Whether or not we 
would choose to interpret a similarly worded federal regula-
tion in that fashion, we are bound by the state court's inter-
pretation, which is relevant to our constitutional analysis 
only insofar as it fixes the meaning of the regulation. 3 We 
3 If the regulation in question established a standard of conduct to which 
the probationer had to conform on pain of penalty-e. g., a restriction on 
his movements-the state court could not constitutionally adopt so unnatu-
ral an interpretation of the language that the regulation would fail to pro-
vide adequate notice. Cf. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 357-358 
(1983); Lambert v. California , 355 U. S. 225, 228 (1957). That is not an 
issue here since, even though the petitioner would be in violation of his pro-
bation conditions (and subject to the penalties that entails) if he failed to 
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think it clear that the special needs of Wisconsin's probation 
system make the warrant requirement impracticable and jus-
tify replacement of the standard of probable cause by "rea-
sonable grounds," as defined by the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court. 
A warrant requirement would interfere to an appreciable 
degree with the probation system, setting up a magistrate 
rather than the probation officer as the judge of how close a 
supervision the probationer requires. Moreover, the delay 
inherent in obtaining a warrant would make it more difficult 
for probation officials to respond quickly to evidence of mis-
conduct, see New Jersey v. T. L. 0., 469 U. S., at 340, and 
would reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of expe-
ditious searches would otherwise create, see New York v. 
Burger, -- U. S. --, -- (1987); United States v. 
Biswell, 406 U. S., at 316. By way of analogy, one might 
contemplate how parental custodial authority would be im-
paired by requiring judicial approval for search of a minor 
child's room. And on the other side of the equation-the ef-
fect of dispensing with a warrant upon the probationer: Al-
though a probation officer is not an impartial magistrate, nei-
ther is he the police officer who normally conducts searches 
against the ordinary citizen. He is an employee of the State 
Department of Health and Social Services who, while as-
suredly charged with protecting the public interest, is also 
supposed to have in mind the welfare of the probationer (who 
in the regulations is called a "client," HSS § 328.03(5)). The 
applicable regulations require him, for example, to "[p]ro-
vid[e] individualized counseling designed to foster growth 
and development of the client as necessary," HSS 
consent to any search that the regulation authorized, see HSS 328.04(3)(k), 
nothing in the regulation or elsewhere required him to be advised, at the 
time of the request for search, what the probation officer's "reasonable 
grounds" were, any more than the ordinary citizen has to be notified of the 
grounds for "probable cause" or "exigent circumstances" searches before 
they may be undertaken. 
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§ 328.04(2)(i), and "[m]onitor[] the client's progress where 
services are provided by another agency and evaluat[e] the 
need for continuation of the services," HSS § 328.04(2)(o). 
In such a setting, we think it reasonable to dispense with the 
warrant requirement. 
The dissent would retain a judicial warrant requirement, 
though agreeing with our subsequent conclusion that reason-
ableness of the search does not require probable cause. 
This, however, is a combination that neither the text of the 
Constitution nor any of our prior decisions permits. While it 
is possible to say that Fourth Amendment reasonableness de-
mands probable cause without a judicial warrant, the reverse 
runs up against the constitutional provision that "no War-
rants shall issue but upon probable Cause." Amendment 
IV. The Constitution prescribes, in other words, that where 
the matter is of such a nature as to require a judicial warrant, 
it is also of such a nature as to require probable cause. Al-
though we have arguably come to permit an exception to that 
prescription for administrative warrants, 4 we have never 
done so for judicial warrants. There it remains true that 
"[i]f a search warrant be constitutionally required, the re-
quirement cannot be flexibly interpreted to dispense with the 
rigorous constitutional restrictions for its issue." Frank v. 
Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, 373 (1959). The dissent neither 
gives a justification for departure from that principle nor con-
' In the administrative search context, we formally require that admin-
istrative warrants be supported by "probable cause," because in that con-
text we use that term as referring not to a quantum of evidence, but 
merely to a requirement of reasonableness. See, e. g., Marshall v. Bar-
low's , Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 320 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court , 387 
U. S. 523, 528 (1967). In other contexts, however, we use "probable 
cause" to refer to a quantum of evidence for the belief justifying the search, 
to be distinguished from a lesser quantum such as "reasonable suspicion." 
See O'Connor~·. Ortega, - U. S.-,- (1987) (plurality); New Jer-
sey v. T. L . 0 ., 469 U. S. 325, 341-342 (1985). It is plainly in this sense 
that the dissent uses the term. See, e. g., post, at 5 (less than probable 
cause means "a reduced level of suspicion"). 
86-5324-0PINION 
GRIFFIN v. WISCONSIN 9 
siders its implications for the body of Fourth Amendment 
law. 5 
We think that the probation regime would also be unduly 
disrupted by a requirement of probable cause. To take the 
facts of the present case, it is most unlikely that the un-
authenticated tip of a police officer-bearing, as far as the 
record shows, no indication whether its basis was first-hand 
knowledge or, if not, whether the first-hand source was reli-
able, and merely stating that Griffin "had or might have" 
guns in his residence, not that he certainly had them-would 
meet the ordinary requirement of probable cause. But this 
is different from the ordinary case in two related respects: 
First, even more than the requirement of a warrant, a proba-
ble cause requirement would reduce the deterrent effect of 
the supervisory arrangement. The probationer would be as-
sured that so long as his illegal (and perhaps socially danger-
ous) activities were sufficiently concealed as to give rise to no 
more than reasonable suspicion, they would go undetected 
and uncorrected. ·The second difference is well reflected in 
the regulation specifying what is to be considered "[i]n decid-
ing whether there are reasonable grounds to believe . . . a 
client's living quarters or property contain contraband," HSS 
§ 328.21(7). The factors include not ?nly the usual elements 
5 Moreover, the dissent cannot, at the same time, proclaim as an abso-
lute (absent a warrant or exigent circumstances) "the right of a man to re-
treat into his own home," post, at 6 (quoting from Silverman v. United 
States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961)), and yet deprecate the need for warrant-
less searches here on the ground that "a probation officer has the special 
advantage of the authority to conduct home visits," and "[o]bservations 
during such visits could provide reasonable suspicion and support a war-
rant or, under exigent circumstances, an immediate search." Post, at 8. 
For one must also justify the authority to compel the probationer to host 
warrantless "home visits" (a friendlier phrase, certainly, but hardly a dif-
ferent reality than "warrantless entries") and to permit the "observations" 
they entail. The difference between us seems to be much more narrow 
than the dissent believes, going, apparently, only to the scope of the war-
rantless search, with the dissent objecting only to one that is "full-blown," 
post, at 9. 
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that a police officer or magistrate would consider, such as the 
detail and consistency of the information suggesting the pres-
ence of contraband and the reliability and motivation to dis-
semble of the informant, HSS §§ 328.21(7)(c), (d); but also 
"[i]nformation provided by the client which is relevant to 
whether the client possesses contraband," and "[t]he experi-
ence of a staff member with that client or in a similar circum-
stance." HSS §§ 328.21(7)(f), (g). As was true, then, in 
O'Connor v. Ortega, supra, and New Jersey v. T. L. 0., 
supra, we deal with a situation in which there is an ongoing 
supervisory relationship-and one that is not, or at least not 
entirely, adversarial-between the object of the search and 
the decisionmaker. 6 
In such circumstances it is both unrealistic and destructive 
of the whole object of the continuing probation relationship to 
insist upon the same degree of demonstrable reliability of 
particular items of supporting data, and upon the same de-
gree of certainty of violation, as is required in other contexts. 
In some cases-especially those involving drugs or illegal 
weapons-the probation agency must be able to act based 
upon a lesser degree of certainty than the Fourth Amend-
ment would otherwise require in order to intervene before a 
probationer does damage to himself or society. The agency, 
moreover, must be able to proceed on the basis of its entire 
6 It is irrelevant whether the probation authorities relied upon any pecu-
liar knowledge which they possessed of the petitioner in deciding to con-
duct the present search. Our discussion pertains to the reasons generally 
supporting the proposition that the search decision should be left to the ex-
pertise of probation authorities rather than a magistrate, and should be 
supportable by a lesser quantum of concrete evidence justifying suspicion 
than would be required to establish probable cause. That those reasons 
may not obtain in a particular case is of no consequence. We may note, 
nonetheless, that the dissent is in error to assert as a fact that the proba-
tion authorities made no use of special knowledge in the present case, post, 
~t 12. All we know for certain is that the petitioner's probation officer 
could not be reached; whether any material contained in petitioner's proba-
tion file was used does not appear. 
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experience with the probationer, and to assess probabilities 
in the light of its knowledge of his life, character and 
circumstances. 
To allow adequate play for such factors, we think it reason-
able to permit information provided by a police officer, 7 
whether or not on the basis of first-hand knowledge, to sup-
port a probationer search. The same conclusion is suggested 
by the fact that the police may be unwilling to disclose their 
confidential sources to probation personnel. For the same 
reason, and also because it is the very assumption of the insti-
tution of probation that the probationer is in need of rehabili-
tation and is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate 
the law, we think it enough if the information provided indi-
cates, as it did here, only the likelihood ("had or might have 
guns") of facts justifying the search. 8 
* * * 
The search of Griffin's residence was "reasonable" within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it was con-
ducted pursuant to a valid regulation governing probation-
ers. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider 
7 The dissent speculates that the information might not have come from 
the police at all, "but from someone impersonating an officer." Post, at 10. 
The trial court, however, found as a matter of fact that Lew received the 
tip on which he relied from a police officer. See 388 N. W. 2d, at 543. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed that finding, ibid., and neither the 
petitioner nor the dissent asserts that it is clearly erroneous. 
8 The dissent asserts that the search did not comport with all the gov-
erning Wisconsin regulations. There are reasonable grounds on which the 
Wisconsin court could find that it did. But we need not belabor those 
here, since the only regulation upon which we rely for our constitutional 
decision is that which permits a warrantless search on "reasonable 
grounds." The Wisconsin Supreme Court found the requirement of "rea-
sonable grounds" to have been met on the facts of this case and, as dis-
cussed earlier, we hold that such a requirement, so interpreted, meets con-
stitutional minimum standards as well. That the procedures followed, 
although establishing "reasonable grounds" under .Wisconsin law, and ade-
quate under federal constitutional standards, may have violated Wisconsin 
state regulations, is irrelevant to the case before us. 
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whether, as the court below held and the State urges, any 
search of a probationer's home by a probation officer is lawful 
when there are "reasonable grounds" to believe contraband is 
present. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court is 
Affirmed. 
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